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FORMAL INDICATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND 
THEOLOGY: BONHOEFFER’S CRITIQUE 
OF HEIDEGGER
Brian Gregor
This paper examines Heidegger’s account of the proper relation between 
philosophy and theology, and Dietrich Bonhoeﬀ er’s critique thereof. Part 
I outlines Heidegger’s proposal for this relationship in his lecture “Phe-
nomenology and Theology,” where he suggests that philosophy might aid 
theology by means of ‘formal indication.’ In that context Heidegger never 
articulates what formal indication is, so Part II exposits this obscure notion 
by looking at its treatment in Heidegger’s early lecture courses, as well as its 
roots in Husserl. Part III presents Bonhoeﬀ er’s theological response, which 
challenges Heidegger’s att empt to maintain a neutral ontology that remains 
unaﬀ ected by both sin and faith.
If we take his word for it, Heidegger’s notion of formal indication (formale 
Anzeige) is good news for theology. The recent translation of Heidegger’s 
lecture course “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” in vol-
ume 60 of the Gesamtausgabe, provides valuable resources for understand-
ing what formal indication is, and extends an invitation to consider fur-
ther Heidegger’s delineation of the oft en ambiguous boundaries between 
philosophical thinking, religious faith, and theological inquiry. In the pres-
ent paper I look at a number of Heidegger’s lecture courses from the 1920s, 
as well as his programmatic statement in the 1927–28 lecture “Phenom-
enology and Theology,” in which Heidegger rules out the possibility of 
Christian philosophy. Yet Heidegger also maintains that this negative pro-
nouncement has ultimately positive implications for both Christian faith 
and theology, since it frees theology to focus on its proper task.
Heidegger suggests that formal indication can act as a methodological 
mediator between philosophy and theology, since it pertains to ontological 
structures, while preserving the integrity of particular ontic (i.e., theologi-
cal) realizations of these structures. Some theologians, such as Heidegger’s 
colleague Rudolf Bultmann, accept this delineation of disciplinary bor-
ders. But Dietrich Bonhoeﬀ er challenges Heidegger on this point, since 
it proceeds with an ontological assumption that is highly problematic: 
namely, that autonomous human being (Dasein) can place itself into the 
truth about its own being. Bonhoeﬀ er contends that Dasein cannot place 
itself into the truth about Being in general, because theology’s claims, 
which derive from revelation, are not only ontic—they are also ontologi-
cal, rendering Heidegger’s fundamental ontology subject to revision. In 
this regard, Bonhoeﬀ er’s critique makes an important contribution to the 
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ongoing discussion of Heidegger’s account of the relationship between 
philosophy and theology.
I. Heidegger on Philosophy, Faith, and Theology
Heidegger opens his lecture “Phenomenology and Theology” by consid-
ering a common conception of the relationship between philosophy and 
theology, according to which knowledge and faith, reason and revelation, 
stand opposed. Heidegger proposes to proceed otherwise. In his view 
this relationship concerns the interaction between two sciences, each with 
distinct possibilities and guiding ideas. Heidegger bases his distinction 
on the ontological diﬀ erence—the diﬀ erence between the ontic and the 
ontological, i.e., between particular beings and the being of those beings. 
Corresponding to this diﬀ erence are two types of sciences, with their own 
modes of discourse aiming at their own types of disclosure: On the one 
hand are ontic sciences, which concern a particular being or region of be-
ings; on the other hand, ontology is the science of being qua being. Thus 
positive, ontic sciences seek to disclose beings, while ontology inquires 
into the being of those beings. For Heidegger, the ontological science is 
philosophy, which diﬀ ers absolutely rather than relatively from all positive 
sciences—including theology.1
In what sense is theology a positive science? Heidegger outlines three 
defi ning features of positive sciences: First, every positive science inquires 
into a region of being that is already disclosed in a preliminary fashion, 
such that this region suggests a possible thematization. Second, this ontic 
region is given in a pre-theoretical manner. Scientifi c thematization does 
not encompass this pre-theoretical disclosure of beings, although the latt er 
may remain implicit and unthematized within positive science. Third, this 
pre-scientifi c comportment to a region of beings is “already illuminated 
and guided by an understanding of being—even if it be nonconceptual.”2 
As we know from Being and Time, this assumption is central to Heidegger’s 
project of fundamental ontology. Dasein always already has a preliminary 
understanding of Being, which philosophy (as the ontological science) in-
vestigates. This assumption will also prove vital to Heidegger’s conception 
of the relationship between philosophy and theology.
Granting this defi nition of positive science, what region of beings does 
theology thematize? According to Heidegger theology’s theme is “Chris-
tianness,” which refers to the experience of faith in everyday existence. 
This “way of existence . . . arises not from Dasein or spontaneously through 
Dasein,” but rather through the revelation of Christ, the crucifi ed God. 
The “existence struck by this revelation is revealed to itself in its forgetful-
ness of God,” and in “being placed before God . . . existence is reoriented 
in and through the mercy of God grasped in faith.”3 Faithful existence is 
therefore the object of theology. Theology is not a science that produces 
speculative knowledge of God; it is not the science of “the all-inclusive 
relationship of God to man and of man to God”; it is not a psychology of 
religion.4 Instead, theology is “the science of the action of God on human 
beings who act in faith.”5
It is important that we understand Heidegger’s distinction between 
faith and theology here, because while “faith does not need philosophy, 
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the science of faith as a positive science does.”6 Heidegger insists that faith 
does not need the insights of philosophy, going so far as to claim that 
faithful existence and philosophy are absolutely mortal enemies.7 Philoso-
phy cannot gain an upper hand over faith, because faith does not seek 
legitimacy in philosophy or any other ‘faithless science.’ These sciences 
‘shatt er’ when they run up against faith—provided, of course, that one 
assumes the perspective of faith. Therein lies the diﬃ  culty of mediating 
the rival claims of faith and philosophy: Faithful existence is impervious 
to external threats, but this imperviousness is no proof for those outside 
of faith.8
Despite this lack of independent philosophical legitimacy, however, 
Heidegger still desires to preserve the integrity of faith. Why? Is it be-
cause of Heidegger’s reverence for religious faith? There is no denying 
that Heidegger holds a certain form of religiousness in high regard, but 
this reverence is not necessarily the motive for his claim that faith does not 
need philosophy. First and foremost, his motive is methodological. Faith 
is one manner of existence among others, and in the everydayness of lived 
experience it does not need philosophy. We might say the same regarding 
an athlete: Philosophy can inquire into athletic existence, but the athlete 
does not need philosophy to exist athletically. In short, ‘faith’ is neither an 
ontic nor an ontological science.
When we seek to articulate faith in creeds, statements, and doctrines, 
however, we enter the realm of theology as a positive science. And 
while “theology itself is founded primarily by faith,” the fact remains that 
as a positive science “its statements and procedures of proof formally 
derive from free operations of reason.”9 Consequently, while faith does 
not need philosophy, theology certainly does. This is not because the-
ology should use philosophy to build itself up via speculative reason. 
Much to the contrary, this is precisely what Heidegger wants theology to 
avoid. Instead Heidegger envisions philosophy guiding theology away 
from speculation and back to its own proper region of inquiry. When it 
is faithful to its proper task, theology does not seek its content in phi-
losophy, but instead permits “its concepts and conceptual schemes to be 
determined by the mode of being and the specifi c substantive content of 
that entity which it objectifi es.” In other words, theology must be faithful 
to lived religious experience instead of burdening itself with a philo-
sophical programme.10
If theology needs philosophy, then, it is “only in regard to its scien-
tifi c character, and even then only in a uniquely restricted, though basic 
way.”11 How? Recall Heidegger’s earlier claim that a science’s pre-thematic 
comportment to the given ontic region is “already illuminated and guided 
by an understanding of being.”12 This means that any region of being—
anything that is, “discloses itself only on the grounds of a preliminary . . . , 
preconceptual understanding of what and how such a being is. Every on-
tic interpretation operates on the basis, at fi rst and for the most part con-
cealed, of an ontology.”13 Since philosophy is the only ontological science, it 
has the unique responsibility of providing a corrective to the positive ontic 
sciences and their basic concepts.14 Philosophy must correct theology by 
formally indicating its proper region. In “Phenomenology and Theology,” as 
with many of his texts through the 1920s, Heidegger employs the notion 
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of formal indication without explaining what it entails. In order to make 
sense of this suggestion, then, we must consider what Heidegger means by 
‘formal indication.’ 
II. On Formal Indication
We fi nd Heidegger’s most explicit and extended discussion of formal indica-
tion in his WS 1920–21 lecture course, “Introduction to the Phenomenology 
of Religion.”15 Heidegger opens the course with methodological refl ections 
on the importance of att ending to the phenomena of religious existence as 
they are concretely given.16 The problem, as Heidegger outlines it, is to fi nd 
a type of language that does not objectify lived experience. Philosophical 
discourse tends to take the particular, the historical and the personal and 
render them in static, calculable concepts.17 Such is the allure of the theo-
retical. But our primordial engagement with the world is not theoretical, 
so when we assume a theoretical posture through philosophy or science, 
we generate concepts while losing touch with the phenomena as they are 
given in concrete lived experience. No doubt a degree of disengagement 
is necessary for philosophical refl ection, just as we need concepts in order 
to proceed philosophically. But Heidegger’s concern is to fi nd a mode of 
philosophical thinking and writing that remains faithful to the singularity 
of concrete lived experience.
a.) In What Sense Formal?
Heidegger presents formal indication as the proper method of phenom-
enological inquiry, since it is grounded in concrete existence and ultimately 
points back to enactment in the same concrete existence. But he is care-
ful to distinguish his notion of ‘formal’ from the generality of Husserl’s 
formalization, which prejudices phenomenological inquiry toward the 
theoretical.18 Heidegger substantiates this claim in his reconfi guration of 
Husserl’s distinction between empty intentions and fulfi lling intuitions.19 
Husserl writes of two distinct acts that constitute meaning: An act that 
intends a meaningful object, and the intuitive act that fulfi lls that intention. 
For example, if my wife says “The picture on the wall is hanging askew,” I 
have a meaning-intention, which remains empty until I look at the wall and 
perceive that the picture is indeed hanging askew—thereby achieving an 
intuitive fulfi llment (in this case sensible) of my intention, with the intend-
ing and intuitive acts forming a unity.
Heidegger takes Husserl’s distinction and alters it, distinguishing be-
tween three moments or “directions” of meaning. These three moments 
are not merely co-existing, separable parts of a phenomenon; rather, a phe-
nomenon “is the totality of sense in these three directions.” One can there-
fore consider a phenomenon in one of three ways: One can inquire into the 
original “what” of the experience, i.e., the content-sense (Gehaltssinn). One 
can also inquire into the original “how” of the experience, i.e., the relation-
al-sense (Bezugssinn). Merold Westphal observes that this distinction be-
tween Gehalt and Bezug resembles (without replicating) Husserl’s distinc-
tion, with the content-sense (Gehalt) approximating the intended meaning 
(the picture hanging askew) and the relational-sense (Bezug) approximat-
ing the mode of this intention (in this case, visual perception).20 But what 
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should we make of the third moment of the phenomenon, which Hei-
degger calls the enactment-sense (Vollzugssinn)? According to Heidegger 
this second “how” concerns the concrete realization in which one accom-
plishes, brings about, or enacts the relational meaning (the fi rst how).21 As 
Westphal suggests, the diﬀ erence between the relational how (Bezugssinn) 
and the enacted how (Vollzugssinn) recalls Husserl’s distinction between 
empty intentions and fulfi lling intuitions. 22 But for Husserl, fulfi llment 
is a cognitive event, involving some mode of observation, recognition, 
remembrance, understanding, etc. By presuming that all phenomena are 
available to this sort of apprehension, Husserl prejudices phenomenology 
toward the theoretical and its objectifying use of concepts. Heidegger, on 
the other hand, is att uned to the elusiveness of phenomena—especially 
the type one encounters in the phenomenology of religious existence. 
Thus the enactment-sense is not simply a cognitive apprehension; rather, 
it requires an active response in one’s concrete historical situation. The 
enactment-sense is a matt er of action, such that it is not simply known—it 
must be done.23
Heidegger argues that Husserl’s formal categories succumb to the prej-
udices of the theoretical because they leave the content-sense (Gehaltssinn) 
undetermined. This is precisely how the formal diﬀ ers from the general; 
namely, general categories are inseparable from their content. 24 For in-
stance, ‘colour’ is present or inherent in ‘red,’ just as ‘red’ is inherent within 
particular instances of redness. By contrast, purely formal categories like 
‘object’ or ‘property’ lack all determinate content, and do not pertain to 
particular species. But here Heidegger poses a question: If formal catego-
ries do not derive from their content, on what basis do we develop purely 
formal categories? Heidegger claims that formalization is not motivated 
by the content of the object, but by the relation to the object. As he writes, 
“I must see away from the what-content [Wasgehalt] and att end only to the 
fact that the object is a given, att itudinally grasped one.” In other words, 
formalization is not a matt er of what, but how. Heidegger’s objection, then, 
is that the how of Husserlian formalization is fundamentally theoretical.
But why does formalization fall prey to the theoretical? Since these 
formal-ontological categories leave the content-sense undetermined, one 
might expect that it remains free of all prejudices. Aft er all, formalization 
can pertain to any content whatsoever. But Heidegger argues that it is 
precisely this indeterminacy of content that is to blame. When a philoso-
pher approaches a phenomenon formally, the relation-sense (Bezugssinn) 
and the enactment-sense (Vollzugssinn) get skewed. Although it leaves the 
content-sense undetermined, the formal-ontological approach prescribes 
the nature of the relation-sense; that is, it prescribes “a theoretical relation-
al meaning,” while hiding “the enactment-character [das Vollzugmäβige]” 
and turning “one-sidedly to the content.”25 In other words, it gives prior-
ity to the objective concepts of the theoretical how, and proceeds to gener-
ate formal categories while ignoring the centrality of the enacted how in 
the phenomenon.
In Heidegger’s view the prioritizing of the theoretical, objective, and for-
mal is the majority voice throughout the history of philosophy. When faced 
with concrete, factical life philosophers have the tendency to take refuge in 
objectivity, which promises reliable and calculable insights regarding the 
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world. The task of formal indication is to “retrieve the phenomena” from 
this theoretical objectivity. Like Husserl’s formal-ontological categories, 
Heidegger’s formal indication still att ends to the relational how (Bezugssinn) 
of the phenomenon, but it gives no preliminary determination to the rela-
tion. Instead, “its relational meaning is held in abeyance,”26 which is crucial 
to preserving the freedom of the enactment-sense against the propensity to 
fall into the theoretical posture.27 But unlike Husserl’s formal-ontological 
categories, formal indication preserves the openness of the enactment how 
(Vollzugssinn). This does not deny the need for the theoretical att itude alto-
gether, but it does deny its primacy—especially in regions like religious life, 
where phenomena are not typically available to such an att itude. In sum, if 
we lack a proper appreciation for the enactment-sense of such phenomena, 
we cannot understand their meanings as they are given in the concreteness 
of historical existence. In order to clarify this notion of the ‘enactment-sense,’ 
however, we must consider what Heidegger means by ‘indication.’
b.) In What Sense ‘Indicative’?
Heidegger’s emphasis on enactment allows formal indication to avoid 
the objectifying tendencies of philosophical concepts, because it does 
not seek to capture or contain the enactment-sense; rather, it indicates the 
enactment-sense. Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s term “indication” 
(Anzeige) from Husserl’s discussion of “essentially occasional expressions” 
in Chapter 3 of Logical Investigation I.28 At that point in the text Husserl has 
established his theory of meaning as an ideal entity, pure and distinct from 
the act that bestows meaning. The ideality of meaning appears tenable 
in some areas of inquiry and discourse (e.g., “an adequately expounded 
scientifi c theory”), where “objective expressions” present meanings that 
are the same in every context.29 But what about expressions like “I am 
here,” or, “It is raining today”? By their very nature the meaning of these 
expressions depends on who speaks them, and at what time and place 
this speaking occurs.30 (In this regard Husserl’s treatment of essentially 
occasional expressions resembles Reichenbach’s later analysis of token-
refl exive expressions, whose truth-value depends on the circumstances of 
their utt erance).
Husserl examines the word ‘I’: Its meaning can be ascertained “only 
from the living utt erance and from the intuitive circumstances which sur-
round it.” Personal pronouns like ‘I’ or ‘we’ serve as universal semantic 
functions that indicate particular people in particular contexts. But this 
semantic function does not immediately constitute the meaning of ‘I’ 
in this context. Instead, every use of the word ‘I’ is accompanied by an 
“I-presentation”, because the self-referentiality of the word ‘I’ involves 
a distinct self-awareness. The speaker’s use of the word is realized in 
the idea of his or her own personality. This “I-presentation” is unique to 
each person, but it allows us to understand another person’s use of the 
word ‘I’. When another speaker uses the word, it indicates the speaker’s 
‘I-presentation,’ enabling the hearer to intuit the self-referentiality of the 
speaker. With the word ‘I,’ “an indicative function mediates, crying as it 
were, to the hearer ‘Your vis-à-vis intends himself.’” 31 The meaning of ‘I’ 
depends on which person says it, but its indicative function allows both 
parties to understand either possible meaning.
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Husserl argues that in occasional expressions there are in fact two mean-
ings “built upon one another”—the indicating meaning and the indicated 
meaning. The indicating meaning is the expression’s general semantic 
function; ‘I’ indicates the specifi c ‘I-presentation’, which is only properly 
meaningful if the indicated meaning (a particular person) is present (in a 
particular context). The indicative function is “exercised for the other, sin-
gular presentation, and, by subsumption, makes the latt er’s object known 
as what is here and now meant.”32 In this regard the relation between indi-
cating and indicated meanings is structurally similar to the relation between 
empty intentions and fulfi lling intuitions,33 since the indication is charac-
terized by an “empty intelligibility” that must be “fi lled.”34 
Heidegger’s notion of formal indication derives from this model of es-
sentially occasional expressions. But whereas for Husserl the fulfi llment 
of an indication comes in the intuition of an ideal meaning, for Heidegger 
an indication points to the how35 of enactment. The phenomena in question 
involve meaningful actions rather than ideas alone. “An indicative defi ni-
tion includes the sense that concretion is not to be possessed there without 
further ado but that the concrete instead presents a task of its own kind 
and a peculiarly constituted task of actualization.”36 Formal indications 
do not indicate meanings to which we can merely give intellectual assent. 
Rather, they indicate possibilities for concrete transformation, pointing to 
ways of being in the world. But Dasein must actualize this transformation. 
Formal indications “can only ever address the challenge of such a transfor-
mation to us, but can never bring about this transformation themselves.”37 
And it is in actualizing this transformation that Dasein enacts the meaning 
of a phenomenon. Formal indication is therefore not objectifying, because 
it directs us away from objective concepts, back to the transformation of 
our own concrete historical existence.
Despite Heidegger’s emphasis on enactment, however, formal indication 
does not prescribe a particular truth or worldview.38 If formal indication 
takes on a particular interpretation of existence, it prejudices one’s phenom-
enological interpretations of existence. Yet while formal indication is not 
prescriptive, it is indicative, directing one’s att ention to the appropriate re-
gion of being. This is how philosophy serves theology. By formally indicat-
ing theology’s proper region of inquiry, philosophy acts as a corrective. But 
philosophy does not direct theology; it co-directs theology by pointing it 
back to its proper areas of inquiry, while not dictating theology’s ventures.39 
Philosophy does not demand that theology acknowledge this corrective; 
in fact, it cannot establish this role for itself vis à vis theology. This relation 
remains the prerogative of theology. Consequently, Heidegger’s model 
might sound like good news for theology. Whether theology should accept 
this model is another question.
III. Bonhoeﬀ er’s Theological Response
We have examined the relationship between philosophy and theology 
from Heidegger’s philosophical perspective. We will now examine the 
transaction from theology’s perspective. But the theological response 
to Heidegger’s model has varied so widely that on this matt er we can-
not speak of theology as a united front, so we will focus specifi cally on 
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Dietrich Bonhoeﬀ er’s response. The convictions motivating Bonhoeﬀ er’s 
critique appear throughout his authorship, but the explicit critique of 
Heidegger appears most prominently in Bonhoeﬀ er’s Act and Being,40 and 
his inaugural lecture entitled “Man [sic] in Contemporary Philosophy 
and Psychology.”41
Bonhoeﬀ er’s criticisms start with the human being’s att empt to under-
stand “himself from his possibilities in refl ection on himself . . . .”42 But 
philosophy cannot proceed otherwise; apart from revelation, it has no 
other resources on which to draw. “Per se, a philosophy can concede no 
room for revelation unless it knows revelation and confesses itself to be 
Christian philosophy in full recognition that the place it wanted to usurp 
is already occupied by another—namely, by Christ.”43 Heidegger excludes 
this possibility completely, along with any notion of ‘Christian philoso-
phy’. By its very essence philosophy cannot make room for revelation. If 
it did, it would no longer be philosophy, since “there is no such thing as 
a Christian philosophy; that is an absolute ‘square circle.’”44 This is not to 
say that Christians cannot do phenomenology, philosophy, or ontology, 
but it does entail that they must do so a-theistically. Qua philosopher, the 
Christian does not know revelation.
Philosophy understands its a-theism as responsible methodology, but 
theology understands it as symptomatic of the cor curvum in se—the heart 
turned in on itself. Autonomous philosophical thought remains imprisoned 
within itself, which “is the true expression of man questioning himself in 
statu corruptionis.”45 Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein is no dif-
ferent, because it begins and ends with Dasein. Of course, for Heidegger 
the analysis of Dasein is subordinate to the larger question of Being qua 
Being. Bonhoeﬀ er recognizes that Heidegger’s project in Being and Time is 
ontological46 and not a melodramatic philosophical anthropology, as many 
mistakenly thought at the time.47 But here is the problem: since Heidegger 
bases his fundamental ontology on the existential analytic of Dasein, every-
thing depends on gett ing Dasein right. Yet if Bonhoeﬀ er is correct, this is 
not possible in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, because autonomous self-
understanding does not belong to Dasein’s possibilities.
Throughout his corpus Bonhoeﬀ er oﬀ ers an ongoing critique of the 
concept of possibility or potentiality as an immanent possession of the 
human being. His critique does not pertain to possibility in the broad 
sense—as, for instance, a trip to the cinema is a possibility for this eve-
ning. Nor does it deny potentiality in the broad sense, such as my young 
cousin’s capacity to learn French. Rather, it concerns the human att empt 
to know the truth about oneself, to know the diﬀ erence between good 
and evil, and to establish one’s status before God. These eﬀ orts are a 
fundamental consequence of sin. Prior to the Fall, humankind existed in 
the image of God (Imago Dei), being for both God and the neighbor in 
an “original creatureliness and limitedness.”48 In this state God was the 
source of all human understanding, and in their relation to God human 
beings did not exist in possibilities, but in the reality of obedience.49 Aft er 
the Fall, humankind became ‘like God’ (Sicut Deus)—“knowing out of its 
own self about good and evil, in having no limit and acting out of its own 
resources, in its aseity, in its being alone.”50 Bonhoeﬀ er’s objection to the 
concept of possibility therefore concerns the human eﬀ ort to understand 
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oneself via refl ection on one’s immanent possibilities, rather than “in the 
act of reference to God.”51
But here another problem arises: According to Bonhoeﬀ er, not only can 
Dasein not understand itself autonomously, it cannot even recognize its 
failure to do so. “It is never possible for a systematic metaphysics to know 
that ‘one cannot give oneself truth,’ for such knowledge would already 
signify a placing of oneself into truth.”52 One can only recognize this from 
the perspective of revelation,53 and one cannot make room for revelation 
and thereby anticipate truth,54 because thought “is as litt le able as good 
works to deliver the cor curvum in se from itself.”55 This concept of sin is 
defi nitive for understanding Dasein’s being: “ . . . it is not possibilities 
which are his nature, but that his nature is determined by ‘Thou art under 
sin’ or ‘Thou art under grace’.”56 The problem is that these ontological 
determinations are only understandable through revelation.
Heidegger agrees with Bonhoeﬀ er on this point, since he himself claims 
that “sin is manifest only in faith, and only the believer can factically 
exist as a sinner.”57 Like Bonhoeﬀ er, Heidegger has read his Luther, whose 
Lectures on Romans proclaim: “Sola fi de credendum est nos esse peccatores” 
(“By faith alone we know that we are sinners”).58 Only the believer can 
understand herself in these categories. Nevertheless, Heidegger maintains 
that ontology still has a role to play. In order to articulate sin theologically, 
the conceptual content of sin requires recourse to the ontological concept 
of guilt, which “is an original ontological determination of the existence 
of Dasein.”59 Although the source of the Christian concept of sin “is given 
only by faith,” the theological concept of sin is nevertheless “a concept of 
existence,” and as such it entails “pre-Christian content.”60 
Operative in this claim is Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic 
and the ontological, which we noted earlier. Theology is an ontic science 
that pursues existentiell questions, i.e., questions regarding Dasein’s own 
concerns and possibilities as a particular existing entity. Philosophy, as 
the ontological science, conducts an existential analytic regarding the 
structures that constitute Dasein’s existence.61 Regardless of the particu-
lar existentiell features of an existing individual, these particularities are 
constituted by fundamental existential structures. This is why Heidegger 
claims that theology can bett er formulate and understand the ontic 
notions of ‘sin’ if it understands the ontological structure of ‘guilt.’ But 
note that Heidegger also rejects the suggestion that sin can “be deduced 
rationally from the concept of guilt,” or that sin is “simply built up upon 
the ontological concept of guilt.”62 Theology does not acquire its ontic 
content from ontology, since only faith knows about sin. That provision 
aside, the conceptual content of sin is nevertheless an ontic determination 
of the ontological structure of guilt.
If philosophy is supposed to oﬀ er guidance and correction to theology, 
one might wonder how philosophy acquires its ontological concepts. All 
philosophical concepts, Heidegger argues, are formally indicative,63 and 
derive hermeneutically from phenomenological inquiry into lived experi-
ence. Thus they are not eidetic, universal forms.64 They are provisional in 
nature, since they arise in the hermeneutical circle. We always enter this 
circle with our preliminary understanding— our ‘forehavings’—of lived 
experience, which are “not something arbitrary and according to whim,”65 
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but instead “receive their concrete, factical, categorical determinateness 
from the respective direction of experience and of interpretation.” Formal 
indications are not prescriptive, and they supply no content. They simply 
point the way, and “give direction to the regard.”66 They express Dasein 
“in advance and propel it forward: grasping Dasein and stirring it by way 
of their pointing.”67 In moving through indication to enactment, the formal 
indication remains open to revision, thus advancing in a hermeneutical 
spiral, “modifying itself in a factical manner from out of the situation with 
respect to, on the basis of, and with a view to which hermeneutical ques-
tioning is operating in the particular case.”68 Consequently, the relationship 
between philosophy and theology can be mutually benefi cial: Ontology 
will be enriched by inquiring into the ontic experience of faithful Christian 
existence,69 while theology will acquire ontological insights regarding the 
being of Dasein.70
According to Heidegger the ontological structures of Dasein pertain to 
all particular existentiell realities, including sin and faith. However radical 
the Christian notion of “rebirth” might be, the fact remains that “Dasein’s 
prefaithful, i.e., unbelieving existence is sublated [aufgehoben] therein.” The 
ontological structures of Dasein are not destroyed by the rebirth of faith, but 
instead are “raised up, kept, and preserved in the new creation.” In other 
words, “pre-Christian Dasein is existentially, ontologically included within 
faithful existence.”71 One might be radically new on an existentiell level, but 
this does not alter the existential structures of one’s being qua Dasein. This 
is why philosophy can continue to play the role of co-director in relation 
to theology. Theological concepts continue to be determined ontologically 
“by a content that is pre-Christian and that can thus be grasped purely 
rationally. All theological concepts necessarily contain that understanding 
of being that is constitutive of human Dasein as such, insofar as it exists at 
all.”72 As an existing human being, then, the Christian’s being is still onto-
logically constituted by the structures of Dasein. 73
This fundamental ontological constitution also enables philosophy’s 
autonomous phenomenological inquiry into the human being. As Rudolf 
Bultmann proposes in his 1930 essay “The Historicity of Man and Faith,” 
philosophy and theology both question the human; the diﬀ erence is that 
philosophy concerns “the natural man” whereas theology concerns “the man 
of faith.” “Natural” in this sense “is a purely formal ontological designa-
tion,” with no regard to questions of faith or unfaith; philosophical analy-
sis only “exhibits the condition of the possibility that a man can comport 
himself faithfully or unfaithfully.”74 Bultmann, whose theology is earnestly 
faithful to Heidegger’s model, vehemently opposes the suggestion that 
faithful existence might be “exempt from the ontological conditions of hu-
man existence.”75 Aft er asking whether theology might correct or amend 
the ontological analysis of Dasein, in order to supplant it with a competing 
ontology, Bultmann’s answer is an exclamatory “No!”76 
Yet this is what Bonhoeﬀ er proposes in his critique of Heidegger and 
Bultmann. In response to Bultmann’s claim that “‘believing Dasein is still 
Dasein in every instance,’”77 Bonhoeﬀ er argues that revelation challenges 
any autonomous ontology of Dasein and its possibilities. In his words, “if 
revelation is essentially an event of God’s free activity, then it supercedes 
and challenges also the existential-ontological possibilities of Dasein.” The 
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event of revelation reveals that “Dasein is no longer essentially identical 
with itself on account of itself,” and this event claims the exclusive right “to 
be the initiator of the unity of Dasein.” In the contingent event of revelation, 
“the deepest root of philosophy, the one from which it derives its claims, it 
cut.”78 Dasein can no longer claim to understand itself through itself.
Heidegger and Bultmann will no doubt chafe at this suggestion, which 
seems to ignore their eﬀ orts to distinguish between existential structures 
and existentiell determinations. But Bonhoeﬀ er does in fact recognize this 
distinction. What he rejects is the insistence that revelation must respect 
the ontological diﬀ erence: “The lett ing go of the ontic by retreat into the 
ontological [unity of Dasein] is considered futile by revelation.” Revela-
tion goes all the way down. Granted, it is an existentiell event, but in this 
event “the existential structure of Dasein is touched and changed. There 
is no second mediator, not even the existential structure of Dasein.” The 
ontological does not lie beyond the reach of revelation. “For revelation, 
the ontic-existentiell and ontological-existential structures coincide.”79 
Pre-Christian existence does not diﬀ er from faithful existence solely on an 
ontic level. It also diﬀ ers ontologically. 
This coincides with Bonhoeﬀ er’s rejection of a neutral ontology based on 
the concept of ‘creation.’ In the state of sin, philosophical refl ection cannot 
know what original creaturely being is. Nor can theology base ontological 
categories on the idea of creation without considering the fact that human 
being is either “being in ‘Adam’” or “being in Christ.” From the perspective 
of revelation, the realities of sin and grace determine Dasein’s being.80 Bon-
hoeﬀ er rejects the “att empt to utilize the idea of creature in a fundamentally 
ontological fashion,”81 arguing that “(t)he ‘there’ [‘Da’] of human beings is 
not to be defi ned independently of the ‘how’ [‘Wie’].” Creaturely Da-sein 
cannot be understood apart from ‘how’ it is, for it “only ‘is’ in Adam or 
in Christ, in unfaith or in faith, in Adamic humanity and in Christ’s com-
munity.” Given the reality of sin, the “concrete being-how-it-is [Wie-sein]” 
violates the created form of Da-sein and renders such distinctions as on-
tic/ontological, existentiell/existential, and there/how meaningless.82 For this 
reason, “the idea of creation is unable to provide a basis for the ontological 
defi nition of the human being in Christ.”83 There is no neutral ontology that 
can serve both being in Adam and being in Christ.
One might respond, as Bultmann does, by acknowledging that revela-
tion does not leave “profane existence” untouched—that revelation gives it 
“a defi nitive ‘clarifi cation’” that philosophy does not perceive.84 But is this 
notion of ‘clarifi cation’ suﬃ  cient? In Bonhoeﬀ er’s view faith is not merely 
a modifi cation of ontic realities, but the deeper modifi cation of ontological 
structures themselves. Dasein in Adam becomes Dasein in Christ. Of course, 
this is hardly satisfying in an autonomous analysis of Dasein, which will 
object to any “pseudo-theological att empt” that seeks to “interpret Christi-
anity as an ‘existential’ of human existence.”85 Theology, Bultmann insists, 
should not presume to be ontology. Bultmann adds that philosophy will 
not object to the ontological possibility of faith, since it is already its respon-
sibility to articulate the conditions of this possibility in Dasein. 
With this claim we broach another decisive diﬀ erence between Hei-
degger/Bultmann and Bonhoeﬀ er. What we fi nd are two diﬀ erent under-
standings of faith: According to the former view, faith is a possibility that 
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belongs to Dasein. It “is not a new quality that inheres in the believer, but 
rather a possibility of man that must constantly be laid ahold of anew 
because man only exists by constantly laying hold of his possibilities.”86 
Bonhoeﬀ er, by contrast, argues that faith does not belong to Dasein as a 
possibility or ability, whether ontic or ontological. Karl Barth’s infl uence 
on Bonhoeﬀ er is clear at this point, with the latt er contending that “faith 
is not even an impossibility but a contingent happening of revelation in 
reality.”87 The same holds for sin, which “also is no human possibility, not 
even of fallen humanity, nor is it an absolute possibility; it is an occurring 
reality.”88 In and of itself, Dasein does not possess the possibility of faith. 
Hence Bonhoeﬀ er’s objection that Heidegger’s ontology is one of “closed-
in fi nitude”: It does not leave room for revelation as a contingent event, 
independent of Dasein’s possibilities. Yet this is what the faithful reception 
of revelation entails. “‘In faith’ people understand themselves as in the 
church of Christ in their new being, in an existential reality that was not 
included in their deepest potentiality.”89 For this reason, the ontological 
structures of Dasein are subject to radical revision in light of revelation.
What might this revised ontology—the being of this new being—look 
like? Ontologically, ‘Being in Adam’ is marked by the fundamental soli-
tude of the heart turned in on itself, estrangement from God and one’s 
neighbor, and internal division. Dasein’s present state is death—i.e., death 
as being unable to live, yet being forced to live from one’s own resources.90 
This claim contrasts sharply with Heidegger, for whom death is Dasein’s 
“ownmost potentiality-for-being”—a possibility that wrenches Dasein from 
the anonymous mass of the ‘they’ (Das Man) and provides the occasion for 
authentic being-towards-death. Such a relation to death is fundamentally 
non-relational—i.e., it separates and individualizes Dasein, because no 
one else can take Dasein’s place in death.91 But according to Bonhoeﬀ er, 
this model of authentic existence only perpetuates the solitude of Dasein 
in statu corruptionis. Dasein fi nds itself not by refl ecting on its own possi-
bilities, but in the reorienting relation to Christ.92
Through the crucifi ed and risen one a new possibility breaks into 
Dasein’s closed world—the possibility of the future, which is for Dasein 
an impossibility. In Christ the human being is defi ned by “something 
outside,” something “‘yet to come.’” The human being is now defi ned by 
an eschatological possibility—by a future that enables one to live in the 
present. This is not the Heideggerian future of one’s own death, because 
that future belongs to Dasein’s own possibilities. Heidegger’s future is 
not a genuine future. “There is a genuine future only through Christ 
and the reality, created anew by Christ, of the neighbor and creation. 
Estranged from Christ, the world is enclosed in the I, which is to say, 
already in the past.”93 In being defi ned by our present possibilities, we 
succumb to the past—viz., sin and death.94
An ontology of ‘Being in Christ’, then, must consider the way Christ 
overcomes the solitude of fallen Dasein, restoring relations and establishing 
Dasein’s being for God and the neighbor. This ontology will also be eccle-
sial in nature, because the church witnesses to this futurity: “The church of 
Christ witnesses to the end of all things. It lives from the end, it thinks from 
the end, it acts from the end, it proclaims its message from the end.”95 The 
church—like the believer—does not proclaim its own resources. It never 
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grasps revelation as an immanent possession, but rather witnesses to the 
good news of the resurrection.96 
Where does all of this leave philosophical ontology? Does it play any 
role in theological inquiry? Can theology successfully ignore philosophy? 
There are signifi cant problems with making indiﬀ erence one’s strategy; 
when theology presumes to ignore philosophy, it usually remains depen-
dent on philosophical insights—but unwitt ingly and thus uncritically.97 
Bonhoeﬀ er recognizes this danger, and always maintains that theology 
cannot simply jett ison philosophy.98 Theological inquiry must begin with “a 
certain formal ‘preunderstanding’, on the basis of which alone questions—
even if the wrong ones—can be raised, whose answer is then surrendered 
by revelation, together with a fundamental correction of the question.”99 In 
other words, theology takes place within the hermeneutical circle. 
But if theology requires these preliminary forms of thought, should 
Bonhoeﬀ er not recognize Heidegger’s formal indication as a valuable tool? 
What, in the end, is the diﬀ erence between Bonhoeﬀ er and Heidegger on 
this point? In summary, we can point to the following: First, we noted 
Bonhoeﬀ er’s critique of Heidegger’s autonomous philosophical analysis 
of Dasein. Dasein presumes to be capable of placing itself into the truth 
regarding its own being.100 Even if Heidegger gives a nod to theology by 
acknowledging that one cannot do this on an existentiell level, Bonhoeﬀ er 
locates this failure at the ontological level. Second, Bonhoeﬀ er rejects the 
view that faith belongs to the ontological possibilities of Dasein, since 
this obscures the status of revelation as a contingent event. Thus formal 
indication cannot point the human being in the right direction, because 
it cannot anticipate faith as a human possibility. Heidegger shows great 
insight by identifying the importance of the enactment-sense in lived 
experience—something that is especially important regarding religious 
phenomena. But for Bonhoeﬀ er, faith is not a possibility one can en-
act—least of all through the direction of autonomous philosophy. Third, 
Bonhoeﬀ er rejects the claim of a neutral ontology of Dasein that remains 
constant through the experience of this revelation, in the transition from 
unfaith to faith. Ontologically, the human person is either Being in Adam, 
or Being in Christ. For this reason Bonhoeﬀ er concludes that Heidegger’s 
ontology, “despite its enormous expansion through the discovery of the 
existential sphere, remains unsuitable for theology.”101 Since Heidegger’s 
method of formal indication assumes his ontology, for theology the good 
news of formal indication turns out to be a false hope.102
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